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Summary
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958
to conduct U.S. government civilian space activities (military space activities are under
the purview of the Department of Defense).  The FY2004 budget request for NASA is
$15.5 billion, compared with its FY2003 appropriations level of $15.3 billion.  During
consideration of that request, attention is expected to focus on the investigation of the
February 1, 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy (see CRS Report RS21408) and its
implications for NASA and the space program as a whole.  A more detailed analysis of
NASA’s FY2004 request is available in CRS Report RL31821.  The House
Appropriations VA-HUD-IA subcommittee marked up the FY2004 appropriations bill
that includes NASA (no bill number yet) on July 15, increasing the request by $71
million.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Agency Overview
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created by the
1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568).  NASA’s charter is to conduct
civilian space and aeronautics activities.  Military space and aeronautics activities are
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community.  DOD
and NASA cooperate in some areas of technology development and occasionally have
joint programs.  NASA opened its doors on October 1, 1958, almost exactly one year after
the Soviet Union ushered in the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite,
Sputnik, on October 4, 1957.  In the more than 40 years that have elapsed, NASA has
conducted far reaching programs in human and robotic spaceflight, technology
development, and scientific research.  
The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.  It has nine
major field centers around the country: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA;
Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA; Glenn Research Center, Cleveland,
OH; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; Johnson Space Center, Houston,
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TX; Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FL: Langley Research Center, Hampton,
VA; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL; Stennis Space Center, near Slidell,
MS.  The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA (often counted as a 10th NASA
center), is a federally funded research and development center operated for NASA by the
California Institute of Technology.   Goddard Space Flight Center manages the Goddard
Institute of Space Studies (New York, NY), the Independent Validation and Verification
Facility (Fairmont, WV); and the Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops, VA). Ames Research
Center manages  Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain View, CA.  Johnson Space Center
manages the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands, NM.   Web links to each are at
[http://www.nasa.gov/nasaorgs/index.html].  NASA employs approximately 19,000 civil
servants (full time equivalents), and 40,000 contractors and grantees working at or near
NASA centers [http:nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm].
The Administrator of NASA is Mr. Sean O’Keefe, who was confirmed by the Senate
on December 20, 2001.  NASA headquarters is organized into six “strategic enterprises”
that correspond to NASA’s major programs: Aero-Space Technology, Biological and
Physical Research, Earth Science, Human Exploration and Development of Space
(HEDS), Space Science, and Education. NASA’s main Web site is [http://www.nasa.gov].
A NASA headquarters’ Web site [http://www.hq.nasa.gov/hq/org.html] has links to the
various NASA program offices, and from those sites, to individual NASA programs.
Significant Changes in NASA’s Budget Structure: “Full Cost
Accounting” and Changes in Appropriations Accounts 
Full Cost Accounting.  Users of NASA’s FY2004 budget material must bear in
mind that it reflects NASA’s shift to “full cost accounting” where funding for each
program includes the costs for personnel and facilities. Previously, those costs were
accounted for separately.  Last year, NASA began the transition by assigning those costs
to each enterprise (i.e. the Earth Science Enterprise).  This year, NASA is taking the
further step of assigning the costs directly to each program.
The intent of full cost accounting is to show more accurately a program’s total cost.
A consequence of this approach during the transition period, however, is to make it appear
that funding for many programs has increased substantially.  Glancing at NASA’s
FY2004 request, one might conclude, for example, that funding for the space shuttle
increased more than $700 million from a request of $3.2 billion in FY2003, to a request
of $3.9 billion FY2004.  In fact, the FY2004 request is only $182 million higher than the
FY2003 request.   The remainder of the difference is due to inclusion of personnel and
facilities costs that were included in the “Investments and Support” line in NASA’s
Human Space Flight budget last year.
New Appropriations Accounts.  A second significant change is different
appropriations accounts.  Not including the Inspector General, which is listed separately,
last year, NASA’s two accounts were Human Space Flight (HSF), and Science,
Aeronautics, and Technology (SAT).  The HSF account included funding for: space
station; space shuttle; payload and Expendable Launch Vehicle support; space
communications and data support; and safety, mission assurance, and engineering.    SAT
funding included: space science, earth science, biological and physical research, aerospace
technology, and academic programs.   This year, NASA is seeking to demonstrate that its
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mission is “Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration,” and that mission is supported by
“Space Flight Capabilities” such as a space station, space transportation (the space shuttle
and expendable launch vehicles), space communications systems, and investing in new
technologies.  Everything that NASA does is not a perfect fit for the new structure.  For
example, nuclear propulsion technologies are included in the Space Science request, not
in Crosscutting Technologies with NASA’s other space transportation investments.
Comparing FY2003 and FY2004.  Thus, care must be exercised in making
comparisons between FY2003 and FY2004.  CRS cannot create a meaningful table
comparing the FY2003 request, FY2003 appropriations, and the FY2004 request, as would
normally be provided in this report.  Instead, two tables are presented. Table 1 shows the
original FY2003 request (without full cost accounting), the FY2003 request with full cost
accounting, and the FY2004 request.  All the figures were provided by NASA.  Special
attention should be paid to the column headings, which explain what the figures
represent.  Table 2 shows what Congress appropriated for NASA for FY2003 using the
FY2003 appropriations categories, with no full cost accounting.
Table 1: NASA’s FY2004 Budget Request





















Science, Aeronautics & Exploration
    Space Science
    Earth Science
    Biological & Physical Research
    Aeronautics




   842
   986




   913
   949




   973
   959
   170
Space Flight Capabilities
    Space Flight
         Space Station*
         Space Shuttle
         Other
    Crosscutting Technologies
         Space Launch Initiative
























   (607)
Inspector General 25 25 26
Total 15,000 15,000 15,469
Source: NASA FY2004 budget documents and H.Rept. 108-10, to accompany H.J.Res. 2.  Column totals may
not add due to rounding.  NASA submitted an amended FY2003 budget request in November 2002, which
NASA used in developing the numbers in this table. The NASA-provided figures in the third (shaded)
column adjust the FY2003 numbers as though they had been prepared in full cost accounting.  They
are for comparison purposes only and do not reflect actual funding increases or decreases.  
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*Does not include funding for space station research, which is embedded in the Biological and Physical
Research line.  For FY2004, that amount is $578 million, making the total FY2004 space station request
$2,285 million.  Some also would include funding for the Orbital Space Plane in the space station request,
but NASA includes it in the Space Launch Initiative line item.  For FY2004, that request is $550 million. 
Table 2.  NASA’s FY2003 Request v. FY2003 Appropriations
(in $ millions)
Funding Category FY2003 Request FY2003 Appropriations
Human Space Flight
   International Space Station
   Space Shuttle
   Payload and ELV Support
   Investments and Support
   Space Comm. & Data Systems















Science, Aeronautics, and Technology
   Space Science
   Biological. & Physical Research
   Earth Science
   Aero-Space Technology













Inspector General 24.6 25.4
TOTAL 15,000.0 15,338.9
Source: NASA FY2003 budget estimate and initial FY2003 operating plan.  Columns may not add due to
rounding.
† Space shuttle is exempt from the rescission (both the amounts under the space shuttle line item and the
shuttle-related funding in the “investments and support” line item.
*Total funding for the space station is the sum of the funding under Human Space Flight plus a portion of
the funding in Biological and Physical Research.  The total FY2003 request for the space station was $1.839
billion; Congress approved that amount and added $8 million for ISS plant and animal habitats.  With the
rescission and other adjustments NASA made in its FY2003 initial operating plan, the amount available for
the space station in FY2003 is $1.810 billion
Issues for Congress
As Congress debates NASA’s FY2004 budget request, attention is focused the space
shuttle Columbia tragedy and its aftermath.  Of NASA’s other activities, Project
Prometheus (see below), in the space science account, may generate the most interest.  A
more comprehensive look at NASA budget issues is available in CRS Report RL31821.
The Loss of Space Shuttle Columbia.  On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle
Columbia disintegrated as it returned to Earth following a 16-day scientific mission in
Earth orbit.  All seven astronauts—six Americans and one Israeli—were killed.   An
investigation is underway.  CRS Report RS21408 provides more information about the
Columbia tragedy and the investigation.  The shuttle fleet is grounded.
What impact the Columbia tragedy will have on NASA, and the space program as a
whole, will not be known until the cause of the accident is understood, and remedial steps
identified and implemented.   When space shuttle flights will resume is unknown, and that
is a critical component of answering questions such as what long-term strategy to follow
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in staffing the International Space Station (ISS).  In the two other cases of U.S. spaceflight-
related fatalities (the 1967 Apollo fire, in which three astronauts died; and the 1986
Challenger tragedy, which killed seven astronauts), the programs were suspended for 21
months and 32 months, respectively.  The chairman of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board publicly stated in June 2003 that he does not believe it will take more
than 6-9 months for NASA to comply with the Board’s recommendations.
The space shuttle has been used to take crews and cargo to ISS, which is under
construction in orbit.  The “Expedition 7” crew—one American and one Russian—is now
aboard ISS (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  They arrived on a Russian Soyuz spacecraft
and can return to Earth at any time using it.    Ordinarily, ISS crews are composed of three
people, but while the shuttle is grounded, NASA and the other ISS  partners (Russia,
Canada, Europe, and Japan) have decided to reduce the crew size to two to lessen resupply
requirements.  ISS crews can be resupplied with food and other consumables using another
Russian spacecraft called Progress.  The Russians have three decades of experience in
operating space stations using only Soyuz and Progress, so it is possible for ISS to continue
operating with crews no matter how long the U.S. shuttle is grounded.  Questions may
arise, though, as to whether there is sufficient reason for them to stay, since the shuttle is
needed to bring additional segments of the space station into orbit to continue construction,
and also to bring the scientific experiments that form the research program. 
 
From a budgetary standpoint, the grounding of the shuttle will impact the schedule for
construction of the station, and could therefore increase its costs.  ISS costs have been
controversial for years because of overruns.  Another part of the NASA budget that could
be impacted is the Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR), which uses the
space shuttle and space station to conduct many of its research activities.  A third part of
the NASA budget that could be impacted is that for the Space Launch Initiative (SLI), now
part of “Crosscutting Technologies.”  NASA decided in November 2002 to rely on the
space shuttle for a longer period of time than originally planned—until 2015 or longer,
instead of 2012.  Instead of continuing attempts to develop technologies to build a “second
generation” reusable launch vehicle to replace the shuttle, NASA decided to focus on
building an Orbital Space Plane (OSP) to take crews to and from the space station, and
separately, on developing technologies for new launch vehicles to take cargo into space.
See CRS Issue Brief IB93062 for more on SLI, and CRS Issue Brief IB93017 for more on
OSP.  In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, NASA may revisit its plans for
developing new space transportation systems.  For example, NASA’s current plan is to
have the OSP ready by 2010 to bring crews back from the space station.  Its full
capabilities—taking crews to the space station as well as bringing them home—is
estimated for 2012.  Some are suggesting that the schedule be accelerated since the shuttle
fleet now consists of only three orbiters and it is not clear if that provides sufficient
capability to meet all of NASA’s needs.  The OSP is still conceptual, however, and it is not
clear that accelerating it would be possible.
The Columbia tragedy may have much broader ramifications, as policy makers and
the public reassess the costs and risks of human spaceflight versus the benefits.  Some are
questioning whether more could be accomplished with robotic spacecraft instead of
sending humans into space, while others are calling for a renewed commitment to human
spaceflight.  It is too soon to assess how this debate will evolve.
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In marking up the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill on July 15 (no bill or
report number yet), the House Appropriations VA-HUD-IA subcommittee took no action
on funding for the space shuttle and related programs while it awaits the report of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Project Prometheus (Nuclear Systems Initiative and JIMO)
In FY2003, NASA requested $125.5 million to begin a “Nuclear Systems Initiative”
to resume development of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and nuclear
propulsion for planetary exploration spacecraft.  Congress approved the program, although
it cut $19 million of the funding.  
In FY2004, NASA is proposing an expansion of the NSI to include a specific
planetary exploration mission that would make use of the new nuclear systems—the Jupiter
Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO).  Its mission would be to search for evidence of oceans on three
moons of Jupiter: Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto.  NASA groups NSI and JIMO together
under the name Project Prometheus.  The FY2004 request for Project Prometheus is $279
million.  The 5-year (FY2004-2008) estimate is $3 billion ($1 billion for NSI, and $2
billion for JIMO). JIMO is a new request in the FY2004 budget, but Congress included $20
million for it in the FY2003 appropriations act (P.L. 108-7, H.Rept. 108-10).  The head of
NASA’s space science office, Dr. Edward Weiler, is quoted in Science magazine (March
28, 2003, p. 1970) as saying the total program cost through 2012 (when JIMO would be
launched) is estimated at $8-9 billion, while cautioning that it is very preliminary.
The project may raise several questions.  First is whether the agency can afford such
an expensive program at this time (when it also is planning to build the Orbital Space
Plane, e.g.).   Second is whether the mission is consistent with NASA Administrator
O’Keefe’s insistence that NASA be a “science-driven” agency.  In this case, some may
argue that this is a “technology-driven” program, since the intent is to develop nuclear
technology, and it appears to some that a science mission was conceived to justify
development of the technology, rather than the reverse. There is strong scientific interest
in detailed studies of Europa, and Congress approved a Europa mission in the FY2002
budget, capping its cost at $1 billion.  In the FY2003 budget request, NASA wanted to
terminate that mission because it was too expensive.  Initiating an even more expensive
mission  may spark debate.  At NASA’s request, the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the
National Research Council developed a “decadal” planetary exploration plan in 2002,
which recommended investigations of Jupiter and its moons, but not JIMO specifically.
In a June 5, 2003 letter to Dr. Weiler, the SSB said that it did not have sufficient
information about the science capabilities of JIMO to determine whether it would meet the
Jupiter-system objectives it had presented.  Third is public reaction to the use of nuclear
power in space.  NASA’s launches of nuclear-powered spacecraft since the late 1980s have
generated protests by some public interest groups concerned about the environment or
other issues. Attempts by those groups to prevent the launches have failed, however.
The House Appropriations VA-HUD-IA subcommittee directed NASA to undertake
an immediate effort to validate radiation hardening technology for the JIMO mission in its
markup of the FY2004 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (no bill or report number yet).
